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SEEING BEYOND THE SMOKE AND IIRRORS
Introduction
In Western culture, money and politics are inseparably
intertwined.' Politicians depend on lobbying interests and corporate
sponsorship not only for election, but for enough "support" to appear
on the ballot. Once elected, this symbiosis permeates all political
decisions. In drafting tax laws and consumer laws, for example,
Congress regularly solicits input into its decision-making process from
Corporate America.2 Corporate America, in turn, re-elects those
politicians who have helped Corporate America.3
The integration of money and politics reflects itself in speech, as
well. Beyond the simple example of a corporate advertisement in
support of a political candidate or issue, the commercial exploitation
of politically controversial products-whether or not for profit-is not
readily discernible as either political or commercial. The effect of
pigeon-holing such "dual aspect speech"4 as either commercial or
political, however, is not merely the topic of bow-tied academics
debating theory; it is the difference between constitutionally protected
speech and paternalistically induced silence.
Despite this overlap, the Supreme Court has historically
distinguished between the constitutional protections afforded political,
religious, and scientific speech and those afforded commercial speech.5
While the former have always enjoyed the fullest First Amendment
protection, commercial speech went unprotected at common law, and
modern commercial speech doctrine imposes on advertising
1. See Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 637 F. Supp. 558, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
2. See generally Peter Dreier, Symposium: The Urban Crisis: The Kerner Commission
Report Revisited: America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1351,
1401 (1993)(noting "the principle of 'one person, one vote' is distorted by the power of big
money in American politics."); Terence Moran, The Drive for Electoral Dollars, RECORDER, Apr.
7, 1992, at 10 (describing how campaign contributors are motivated by prospective favoritism in
government).
3. See, e.g., Don Van Natta, Jr., $250,000 Buys Donors 'Best Access to Congress,' N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1997, at Al ("For elite donors who contributed at least $250,000, the Republican
Party offered a new enticement ...[:] staff members to help with problems in
Washington. . . .The link between political donations and access to government officials is
[also] at the core of the fund-raising controversy that has enveloped the Democratic Party.").
4. This Note will refer to speech which contains both commercial and non-commercial, or
public-interest, aspects as "dual-aspect" speech.
5. See discussion infra Part 1.
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regulations a four-part intermediate scrutiny test which lacks the full
measure of constitutional protection.6
The difficulty of dissecting the political and commercal aspects of
speech poses an inherent definitional obstacle in classifying speech as
either purely commercial or political. "Commercial speech" may be
discernible in a sub-category of "purely commercial speech," which is
narrowly defined as the interchange of information proposing a
particular business transaction.7 An advertisement simply identifying a
product and listing its selling price falls into this category. Speech,
however, is not always so precisely categorized in one box or another.
For example, how should a Planned Parenthood advertisement
offering abortion services be categorized? What about a Marlboro
advertisement which both glorifies its product and denounces
government efforts to regulate tobacco? A gun advertisement?
Moreover, is it the speaker's intent, the recipient's understanding, the
objective information, or some other variable that is dispositive of the
classification? Courts have grappled with these issues in vain for
decades. The culmination is an unpredictable, logically unsound
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech based on
assumptions that cannot be validated.
Last term, the Supreme Court decided 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island,8 in which a majority of the Court cast doubt on the
continuing efficacy of the commercial speech doctrine. In declaring
unconstitutional Rhode Island's blanket ban on the advertising of
liquor prices, Justice Stevens' plurality opinion fell just short of
advocating that commercial speech protection be raised to the level
enjoyed by political speech.9 In his concurrence, Justice Thomas
explicitly argued for the abandonment of the dichotomized
approach.10
Recent efforts to regulate tobacco advertising serve as a prime
illustration of the need to eradicate the illusory distinction between
commercial and non-commercial speech.11 On August 10, 1995,
President Clinton proposed a partial ban on tobacco advertising for
6. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
7. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
8. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). For a full discussion of the opinions in this case, see discussion
infra Part I.E.
9. See infra Part I.E.
10. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1575-1620 (Thomas, J. concurring).
11. See discussion infra Part III.
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the purpose of decreasing smoking among children.' Nearly one year
later, the FDA declared nicotine a "drug," and imposed strict limits on
tobacco advertising. 13 Similar proposals and state regulations have
been pervasive in recent years. 14  In turn, tobacco companies
immediately challenged the legality of such regulations.'5 However,
legal scholars anticipate a long battle destined for the Supreme
Court.1 6 An analysis of commercial speech jurisprudence reflected
through the lens of a ban on tobacco advertising, therefore,
demonstrates the need to overhaul this unworkable commercial
speech doctrine.
Part I traces the history of the commercial speech doctrine,
focusing on Central Hudson and the Court's subsequent attempt to
fine-tune its requirements. This historical overview is necessary to
elucidate the Supreme Court's struggles both in discerning commercial
and noncommercial speech and in justifying the distinction. This Part
also outlines the recent 44 Liquormart decision, illustrating the
fractured Court's general reluctance to relegate commercial speech to
secondary status. Part II summarizes President Clinton's and the Food
and Drug Administration's recent regulations on tobacco advertising.
Finally, Part III argues that the Supreme Court should eradicate the
untenable distinction between political and commercial speech, and
provide the latter the full protections enjoyed by the former.
Concordantly, this Note argues that President Clinton's proposed
tobacco advertising regulation should be declared unconstitutional. 7
12. Wendy Fox, The President's Plan to Prevent Teen-Age Smoking is Controversial,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 4, 1995, at 13.
13. 61 Fed. Reg. 44615 (1996)(to be codifed at 21 CFR § 897); Felix H. Kent, Highlights of
Decisions in 1996, N.Y. LJ., Dec. 20, 1996, at 3.
14. See Kenneth L. Polin, Argument For the Ban of Tobacco Advertising: A First
Amendment Analysis, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 99 (1989); Paul J. Weber & Greg Marks, Debate on the
Constitutionality and Desirability of a Tobacco-Products Advertising Ban, 15 N. Ky. L. REV. 57
(1988); Comment, Up In Smoke: Commercial Speech and a Tobacco Products Advertising Ban,
54 TENN. L. REV. 703 (1987)[hereinafter Comment, Up in Smoke].
15. FDA, Tobacco Firms May Reach Settlement, WEST'S LEGAL NEws, Dec. 23, 1996 (noting
tobacco companies have filed briefs in Beahm v. FDA, No. 95-CV00591 (M.D. N.C. 1995)).
16. Claudia MacLachlan, Big Tobacco Presses Case vs. the FDA, NAT'L U., Oct. 28, 1996,
at A12.
17. While this Note focuses on the First Amendment implications of Clinton's proposed
tobacco advertising ban, opponents of the ban also argue that the Food and Drug Administration
lacks jurisdiction to regulate tobacco. See, e.g., Comment, An Exercise in Administrative
Creativity: The FDA's Assertion of Jurisdiction Over Tobacco, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 991 (1996);
Susan H. Carchman, Should the FDA Regulate Nicotine-Containing Cigarettes? Has the Agency
Established a Legal Basis and, If Not, Should Congress Grant It, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 85 (1996);
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Moreover, Part III illustrates the unconstitutionality of Clinton's
proposed tobacco advertising ban under the current intermediate
scrutiny standard articulated in Central Hudson. Toward this end, this
Part critiques and disproves two recent decisions in which the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit both misconstrued and
misapplied the intermediate scrutiny standard of Central Hudson, as
modified by recent Supreme Court decisions, including 44 Liquormart.
I
The Commercial Speech Doctrine
A. Early Case-Law
The Supreme Court first dichotomized commercial and
noncommercial speech in Valentine v. Chrestensen8 in 1942 but cited
no support for the distinction. 9 In Chrestensen, plaintiff challenged a
local ordinance which prohibited the distribution of handbills,20 and
argued that the First Amendment protected commercial speech.2 The
Court disagreed-without citing any precedent-and held that "purely
commercial" speech is not protected under the First Amendment.'
While Chrestensen's holding narrowly applied to purely commercial
speech,23 the Court did not offer any guidelines with which lower
courts could discern purely commercial from noncommercial speech,
or speech which contained aspects of both. Chrestensen implied,
however, that the speaker's motive is dispositive in classifying the
speech 4
The implied rationale that the speaker's motive defines the
speech is logically unsound and has not survived judicial and academic
scrutiny 5 Consider, for example, a politician's memoirs. While the
Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA's Effort to Regulate
Tobacco Products, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1996).
18. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
19. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV.
627, 627-28 (1990).
20. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 54.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,265-66 (1964).
24. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 55 (characterizing commercial speech in terms of the speaker's
"promot[ion]" and "pursuit" of money, and concluding "[i]f the respondent was attempting to use
the streets of New York by distributing commercial advertising, the prohibition . . . was
lawful[I")(emphasis added).
25. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 628-29.
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speaker's profit motive is likely the driving force behind the speech,
few would doubt that the book contains political speech deserving of
full constitutional protection. And so, with Chrestensen, the Supreme
Court created the commercial/noncommercial distinction with neither
precedential support nor sound logic.26
In subsequent years, the Court was reluctant to judicially classify
speech as either purely commercial or non-commercial.2 In Breard v.
City of Alexandria, the plaintiff challenged a public nuisance
ordinance which prohibited merchants from soliciting business on
private property.2 The Court held that speech created "for profit" was
not beyond the First Amendment's ambit merely because of the
speaker's economic motive. 9 In reaching that decision, the Court
balanced the defendant-magazine publisher's interest in soliciting
subscriptions against the privacy interests of property ownersY The
Court upheld Breard's conviction, finding that the property owners'
privacy interests outweighed Breard's interest in soliciting commercial
transactions.31
B. Subsequent Protection
The Supreme Court's inability to define the parameters of
commercial speech has been pervasive, and that inability has perhaps
been the only static variable in commercial speech jurisprudence.
While Chrestensen categorized speech by assessing the speaker's
motive, subsequent cases followed Breard in questioning the logic of
that approach. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Rights,2 the plaintiff, a newspaper company, violated a city
ordinance by utilizing a classification system of employment
advertisements on the basis of sex.' The Court held that a
newspaper's "want-ads" were purely commercial, and thus
unprotected under Chrestensen.31 The Court focused on the content of
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
28. Id. at 624-25.
29. Id. See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943)(holding religous
organization's door-to-door solicitation, while commercial in nature, does not transform it into a
"commercial enterprise.")
30. Breard, 341 U.S. at 644.
31. Id. at 645.
32. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
33. Id. at 379.
34. Id. at 388, 391.
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the speech, rather than the speaker's motive,3' and found that the
newspaper's want-ads promoted illegal discrimination because they
classified ads on the basis of sex. 36
The following term, the Supreme Court in dicta severely
undermined Chrestensen, casting doubt on whether that case had
"survived reflection."37 In Bigelow v. Virginia, plaintiff was convicted
of violating a state statute proscribing the publication of
advertisements which encouraged or aided abortions. 38 The Virginia
Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment was inapplicable to
paid commercial advertisements and upheld the statute.' The
Supreme Court disagreed and held that dual-aspect speech was not
stripped of its First Amendment protection solely on the basis of its
commercial aspects.' The Court expressly renounced its motive test,
in favor of a content-based inquiry.4' The Court applied a balancing
test to determine whether the regulation was reasonable and served a
"legitimate public interest."'42 The Court found that the public's
interest in receiving information regarding abortions outweighed the
state's interest in maintaining an educational atmosphere in its college
dormitories, and held that abortion advertisements in a university's
underground newspaper were protected by the First Amendment. 43
In the 1970's, the Court seemed ready to admit its mistake and
dispose of the illusory and indefinable distinction between commercial
and noncommercial speech. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
35. Id. at 388.
36. Id.; cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)(holding newspaper
publisher's editorial advertisement denouncing local government's suppression of civil rights
activisim protected by the First Amendment; fact that papers were sold "for-profit" was not
dispositive of "pure commercial speech" classification).
37. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,820 n.6 (1975).
3& Id. at 812.
39. Id. at 814, 818.
40. Id. at 818.
41. Id. at 820-22.
42. Id. at 825-26. Two years later, the Court elevated regulations on abortion
advertisements to a strict scrutiny test in light of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973), in which
the Court recognized a qualified constitutional right to abortion. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678,688 (1977).
43. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826. The Court's illustrative list of factors to be considered in
regulating advertising included the relationship of the speech to the commercial activity; the
public's interest served by regulation; the extent of fraud and/or deceit contained in the message;
the hearers' privacy interests; and the extent to which the audience is held captive to the speech.
Id at 826-29.
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Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,' the Court re-addressed
specifically the Chrestensen issue: whether purely commercial speech
is protectable under the First Amendment.! A Virginia statute
prohibited licensed pharmacists from advertising the prices of
prescription drugs.' The Board argued that the regulation was
necessary to maintain the high professional standards of licensed
pharmacists.47 The Court disagreed. It struck down the ordinance and
affirmed the Bigelow approach of evaluating the content, and not the
motive, of speech in assessing its First Amendment protection.4
Despite the pharmacists' "purely economic" motive, the Court
emphasized a broad range of interests in securing the free flow of
advertising:49 "As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow
of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener
by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate. "0
Along with the speaker's and hearer's interests in advertising, the
Court noted a general societal interest in the free flow of
information.51
The Court reasoned that the free flow of commercial information
was integral to a free-enterprise society: "So long as we preserve a
predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our
resources in large measure will be made through numerous private
economic decisions."' The Court refused to adhere to blurred lines
separating commercial and political speech, and declared that, in a
democracy, the free flow of information enlightens commercial as well
as political decisionmaking.5 Thus, Virgina State Board's balancing
test mandated a case-by-case approach, the outcome of which was
largely dependent upon the content of the speech and the public's
interest in access to a free flow of information'-commercial as well
as political.
44. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
45. Id. at 760-61.
46. Id. at 749-50.
47. Id. at 751.
4& Id. at 761.
49. Id. at 763-64.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 764 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)(protecting abortion
advertisements)).
52. Id. at 765.
53. Id.
54. See Comment, Up In Smoke, supra note 14, at 706. For example, in one line of cases, the
Court has noted the special circumstances of lawyer advertising, and has subjected commercial
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C. Intermediate Scrutiny
The Court never did take the next step after Virginia State Board
and eradicate the commercial speech distinction. Instead, the Court
created a standard commercial speech test aimed at assuring
consistency, but resulting in an ad hoc, unpredictable, case-by-case
assessment.-5 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York,56 the Court created the modern test for
commercial speech, adopting an intermediate scrutiny standard.
Under the Central Hudson test, the threshhold inquiry is whether
the communication is misleading or related to unlawful activityY If it
is not, then the speech is protectable under the First Amendment and
the regulation must satisfy the second, third, and fourth prongs in
order to withstand scrutiny.8 Under the second prong, the
government must assert a substantial interest in regulating the
commercial speech.59 Third, the government must show that its
regulation directly advances its interest.' Fourth, the government
must show that its interest could not be served as well by a more
limited restriction on commercial speech.61 Because the result under
prongs three and four vary according to the weight a court gives both
to the legislature's purported interest and to the corroborating
evidence that the proffered regulation will secure that interest, courts
have inconsistently applied Central Hudson's framework.62
In Central Hudson, the plaintiff, an electrical utility, challenged a
regulation prohibiting promotional advertising by the utility.6 1 The
Commission argued that banning promotional advertising of public
speech in that context to closer scrutiny. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
55. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 631.
56. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
57. Id. at 566.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Courts have varied in their interpretation of Central Hudson's fourth prong. While
some cases have construed a least-restrictive-means mandate, see, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988), other cases have sustained the regulation upon a lesser
showing, see, e.g., Posadas De Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328
(1986).
62. Maria J. Johnson, Note, Taking Advantage of Joe Camel's and Marlboro Man's Rights
Is Unkool and Merits Constitutional Protection: Penn Adver., Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 21 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 489, 494 (1996); see also Kozinksi & Banner, supra note 19, at 630-31, 648-49.
63. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 559.
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utilities was justified in furthering energy conservation and
counterbalancing utilities' monopolistic practices in New York.' The
Court disagreed and invalidated the ban because the Commission
failed to satisfy its burden 65 with a showing that a more limited
restriction would fail to serve the state's interests.66
While it did not posit an explicit evidentiary standard, Central
Hudson did require the state to advance "authoritative findings" that
its interests would be advanced by regulation, and that it lacked an
alternative to chilling commercial speech.67 And while Central
Hudson's heightened protection of commercial speech seems in part a
combination of prior decisions which balanced the competing interests
of particular communications,' it was also a clarification of the
Court's First Amendment policy in the context of commercial speech.
Although commercial speech gets less protection than political speech,
the public has a strong interest in both classes of speech, namely
receiving the "fullest possible dissemination of information" to use in
making its own decisions-political as well as commercial-free from
paternalism. 69
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens emphasized the
inherent subjectivity in distinguishing commercial from non-
commercial speech: "[E]ven Shakespeare may have been motivated by
the prospect of pecuniary reward." Similarly, Justices Brennan and
Blackmun expressed concern over the potential breadth and
subjective application of Central Hudson, doubting "whether
suppression of information concerning the availability and price of a
legally offered product is ever a permissible method for the State to
'dampen' demand for or use of the product."71 Justice Blackmun
ardently opposed the commercial/noncommercial dichotomy:
No differences between commercial speech and other protected
speech justify suppression of commercial speech in order to
influence public conduct through manipulation of the availability of
information. . . . [Advertising regulations are] a covert attempt by
the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens, ... [protecting
64. Id. at 568.
65. The burden is on the party attempting the regulate the speech. Zauderer v. Office of
Disiplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985).
66. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570.
67. Id.
68. See Comment, Up In Smoke, supra note 14, at 712.
69. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62
70. Id. at 580.
71. Id. at 574 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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the State] from the visibility and scrutiny that direct regulation
would entail.72
The Court in Central Hudson presumably intended to displace
lower courts' inconsistency and confusion in analyzing commercial
speech by creating a standard test for its regulation, that has resulted
in an oft-criticized, ad hoc test resting on unfounded assumptions and
illogical distinctions. 73
After Central Hudson, the Supreme Court generally rejected as
paternalistic government claims that its regulation of commercial
speech was the proper means of protecting the public from the
influences of advertising.74 However, the Court sustained such a
regulatory purpose and sanctioned such paternalistic regulation of
commercial speech in Posadas De Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
Co. of Puerto Rico.75 The Court in Posadas upheld a Puerto Rico
statute which prohibited gambling casinos from advertising to
residents.76 The casinos argued that the regulation was underinclusive
because it permitted the advertising of other gambling such as horse
racing and lottery games. 77 The Court disagreed, citing, as its primary
rationale, Puerto Rico's history of prohibiting casino gambling
through 1948.78
"It is precisely because the government could have enacted a
wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct79 that it is permissble
for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing the
conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on
advertising. '"80 This rationale, known as the "greater includes the
72. Id. at 574-78, (Blackmun, J., concurring).
73. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 631.
74. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68-75 (1983); Linmark
Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 8-
9 (1979).
75. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
76. Id. at 344.
77. Id. at 342.
78. Id. at 343 n.8.
79. Cf. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)(holding state cannot limit
advertising of contraception because such regulation impinges upon a woman's constitutional
right to abortion). See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)(same).
80. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346. This rationale resembles the "bitter with the sweet" principle
of Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), in which the Court acquiesced to legislative conditions
on statutory entitlements, irrespective of whether the limits alone would satisfy the Constitution.
This principle was overruled, however, in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532 (1985), where the Court required that the legislature's conditions independently satisfy
procedural due process, even though the citizens' rights were statutorily created. In light of
[VOL. 9:517
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lesser" rationale, is an enigma in First Amendment jurisprudence and
has since been renounced by the Supreme Court.8
The Posadas Court focused on prongs three and four of the
Central Hudson test, reducing the state's burden to a showing of "the
'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to
accomplish those ends." ' The Court found the legislature's
conclusions-that advertising bans would reduce resident gambling-
"reasonable," ' and upheld the regulation.84 While Posadas seemingly
undermined Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny standard, the
Court has not gratuitously extended its deferential approach and has
repeatedly struggled in reconciling Posadas with Central Hudson and
commercial speech jurisprudence.' Recently, a unanimous Supreme
Court declared Posadas an aberration in commercial speech doctrine,
and hammered the long-awaited nail in its coffin.86
Loudermill, Posadas wrongly deferred to Puerto Rico's legislature merely because it "could
have" made gambling illegal. Furthermore, irrespective of Loudermill, Central Hudson requires a
regulation to satisfy its intermediate scrutiny standard so long as the communication involves a
legal activity-not a constitutionally protected activity. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). For a comprehensive discussion of
Posadas and the Supreme Court's subsequent attempt to reconcile Posadas with commercial
speech doctrine, see infra, text accompanying notes 144-148, 156, 223-228.
81. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1512 (1996).
82. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341; see also Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 476 (1989)(same). In Fox, the Court refused to interpret Central Hudson's
"necessary" requirement as a least-restrictive-means approach. Construing the word "necessary"
by analogy to Article I, section 8 "Necessary & Proper" Clause case-law, see, e.g., McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), the Court reduced the government's burden under prong four of
Central Hudson to a showing of "reasonableness." Fox, 492 U.S. at 480. To the extent that this is
wholly inconsistent with Central Hudson and its progeny, Fox, as well as Posadas, should be
overruled. Moreover, the Court in Fox conceded that "Necessary & Proper" Clause case-law
"do[es] not of course govern [commecial speech analysis]" and cited only Posadas for its
reduction of Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny standard to a rational basis approach. Fox,
492 U.S. at 479. The Court has not construed Fox, however, as a deferential rule, and has
maintained the government's burden in proving that the regulation effectuates its proffered goal.
See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993). In
Discovery Network, the Court clarified its holding in Fox.
[W]hile [Fox] rejected the least-restrictive-means test for judging restrictions on
commercial speech, so too have we rejected mere rational basis review. A regulation
need not be "absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end," [under Fox],
but if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction
on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether
the "fit" between ends and means is reasonable.
Id. (citations omitted).
83. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342.
84. Id. at 344.
85. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585-90 & n.2 (1995).
86. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1511-13, 1522 (1996).
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In 1993 the Court explicitly resurrected the efficacy of Central
Hudson's third and fourth prongs.' In Edenfield v. Fane, the plaintiff,
an accountant, challenged a state ban on in-person solicitation by
certified public accountants. 8 The plaintiff argued that the ban
violated the First Amendment and precluded him from competing
within his profession.' The Court emphasized Central Hudson's third
and fourth prongs and required the government to show that the
regulation advances its interests in a "direct and material way,"
imposing an evidentiary standard by which the government should
satisfy this burden.' °
[T]he regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective
or remote support for the government's purpose. . . . This burden
is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a
governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial
speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that
its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree?1
The Court invalidated the Florida Board of Accountancy's ban on
in-person solicitation by CPAs because the Board had failed to
provide any studies or anecdotal evidence "validat[ing]" the Board's
supposition that in-person solicitation furthers fraud and is
overreaching.92
During the same term, the Court in United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co.93 upheld a federal statute prohibiting radio
broadcasts of lotteries to states which do not allow lotteries. 4 In his
dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the state failed to satisfy its burden
of demonstrating a reasonable fit between the legislature's interests
and the means used to further those ends. 5 The majority's holding,
however, did not jeopardize Edenfield's resurrection of Central
Hudson because the Court's basis for upholding the ban in Edge was
that the broadcasting reached North Carolina, a state in which
87. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
88. Id. at 763-64.
89. Id. at 764.
90. Id. at 762.
91. Id. at 770-71 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
92. Id. at 770-71. The Court's strict evidentiary requirement in Edenfield, while not
explicitly overruling Posadas and Fox, severely undermined and plausibly reduced them to
narrow, practically uncitable holdings.
93. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
94. Id. at 436.
95. Id.
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lotteries were illegal. Thus, under Central Hudson, Edge did not
satisfy its threshhold requirement of communicating a "legal activity"
and the Court's application of Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny
test was mere dicta. Justice Stevens' derision of commercial speech
regulation would soon garner support and re-appear in majority and
plurality opinions in subsequent terms.'
D. 1995 Decisions
The current Supreme Court has grown impatient in grappling
with the commercial/noncommercial distinction. In three decisions
over the past two years, the Court has recognized that paternalism
under the guise of advertising regulation does not withstand First
Amendment scrutiny.
In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,' the plaintiff, a beer
manufacturer and distributer, challenged the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act which prohibited beer labels from displaying
alcohol content.' The government argued that the ban was necessary
to prevent "strength wars" between competing beer companies." The
Court held that the Act failed the Central Hudson test and thus
violated the First Amendment. 101 Because the parties stipulated to the
labels' truthful and nonmisleading characteristics," the Coors
decision focused on Central Hudson's second, third, and fourth prongs,
essentially deciding whether the labeling ban had an "acceptable fit"
with the government's substantial interests, and whether the
regulation was more extensive than necesary. 1m The government
argued that its dual interests of curbing "strength wars"'l to protect
beer drinkers who purchase beer on the basis of alcohol content and
facilitating states' efforts in regulating alcohol under the 21st
Amendment"° justified its regulation.
96. Id. at 429-30.
97. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
98. 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
99. Id. at 1588.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1596.
102. Id. at 1590.
103. Id.
104. "Strength wars" are the competitions among beer brewers who, in an attempt to market
their product, advertise the alcohol content of their beers. Id.
105. The 21st Amendment repealed the 18th Amendment, thereby ending Prohibition. U.S.
CONsT. amend. XXI.
1997]
The Court rejected these claims, finding insubstantial the
government's interest in suppressing competition through regulating
promotion and marketing strategies.' Justice Thomas, in the majority
opinion, rationalized that the "general thrust of federal alcohol policy
appears to favor greater disclosure of information, rather than less,"
citing the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, which
requires lables of food products to display nutritional information. 1°7
The Court did not provide an extensive analysis of Central Hudson's
second prong, but rather deferred to the Court of Appeals' conclusion
that the government's interest in promoting the general health, safety
and welfare of its citizens was "substantial."'"
Under prongs three and four, the Court noted that Central
Hudson, as modified by Edenfield and Posadas, requires consideration
of the "fit" between the government's substantial interests and the
means chosen to accomplish those ends.109 Justice Thomas emphasized
that Edenfield's requirements-that the government demonstrate that
the harms were real and that its regulation would actually alleviate
them to a material degree-were "critical.""11
The government argued that the suppression of alcohol content
on beer labels would thwart strength wars as a matter of "common
sense."'' i The Court rejected this argument, holding that the FAAA's
ban could not directly and materially reduce strength wars because of
the inconsistency of federal policy regarding the dissemination of
alcohol information.1 First, the Court criticized the FAAA ban as
underinclusive because it prohibited alcohol on beer labels, but did
not regulate advertising."3 Thus, the FAAA would not directly
advance the government's stated purpose because consumers could
106. Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1591.
107. Id. at 1590-91. Similarly, if not identically, federal tobacco policy also favors disclosure
under both the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, cited in Coors, and the Cigarette
Labeling Advertising Act of 1965, which requires cigarette labels and advertising to include
warnings by the Surgeon General. See infra text accompanying notes 213-214.
10& Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1591. The Court's brief discussion of the government's "substantial
interest" is noteworthy. In conceding the "subtantiality" of the government's interest in
regulating beer labels, the Court allowed itself to address the merits of prongs three and four,
where the Court highlighted the extent to which the government must prove that its interests
would be advanced in a "direct and material" way. If it had not acquiesced on the efficacy of
prong two, the remainder of its decision would have been dicta.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1592.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1593.
113. Id. at 1592.
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still discover the disparity in competing manufacturers' products.1 4
Second, the FAAA regulated only beer, not stronger alcoholic
beverages such as wine and hard liquor."5 The Court emphasized the
government's lack of "convincing evidence that the labeling ban ha[d]
inhibited strength wars," and found that the Court would not assume
any correlation between the ban and the absence of strength wars
without hard data.11 6
The Court also stated that the government failed to show that the
fit between the regulation was "sufficiently tailored" to its goal under
Central Hudson's fourth prong."7 The government's alternative
options-"directly limiting the alcohol content of beers, prohibiting
marketing efforts emphasizing high alcohol strength . . . or limiting
the labeling. ban only to malt liquors"" 8 --indicated that the FAAA
was "more extensive than necessary."11 9
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens advocated the
abandonment of a rigid commercial/noncommercial distinction in First
Amendment analysis.'m Because the constitutionality of a commercial
communication is assessed independently of both the speaker's motive
and the content of the speech, Justice Stevens argued that Central
Hudson has been "artificially" applied, 21 stating "[n]either can the
value of speech be diminished solely because of its placement on the
label of a product .... I see no reason why the fact that such
114. Id. at 1593.
115. Id. at 1592.
116. Id. at 1593.
That respondent wishes to disseminate factual information concerning alcohol content
does not demonstrate that it intends to compete on the basis of alcohol content. Brewers
may have many different reasons-only one of which might be a desire to wage a strength
war-why they wish to disclose the potency of their beverages.
Id. (emphasis added).
117. Id. While highly persuasive, the Court's analysis of Central Hudson's fourth prong is
arguably dicta, because the Court initially held that the regulation violated the First Amendment
under Central Hudson's third prong.
11& Id. The Court implies that, for First Amendment purposes, an outright ban on a product
is less restrictive than maintaining its legality and prohibiting its advertising. This has strong
implications for tobacco advertising bans. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
119. Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1594. This language strongly suggests that the Court in
Coors rejected Posadas' quasi-rational basis, deferential standard in applying Central Hudson's
fourth prong. Coors also rejected Posadas' affirmation of a government's regulation of harmful,
legal activity under a less restrictive standard than Central Hudson requires.
120. Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1595.
121. Id.
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information is disseminated on the labels of [commercial] products
should diminish that constitutional protection." 122
The Supreme Court strengthened Central Hudson in another 1995
decision. In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. ,'3 the Court held that the
Florida Bar's regulation prohibiting lawyers from using direct mail to
solicit personal injury or wrongful death clients within thirty days of an
accident passed constitutional muster under Central Hudson.1' While
the Court has analyzed attorney advertising and solicitation decisions
under less stringent standards than other commercial standards, if only
implicitly,' Florida Bar provides insight into the evidentiary
standards a government is required to satisfy under Central Hudson's
third and fourth prongs. In Florida Bar, the Court affirmed the
regulation because the Bar had conducted a two-year study of
attorney advertising and soliciations. The lengthy summary submitted
to the court showed that lawyer solication of accident victims
effectuated pervasive invasions of privacy. 126
Most interesting about Florida Bar is the potential for a swing-
vote for future commercial speech cases. In an ardent dissent, Justice
Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, demanded
"actual surveys" accompanied by "procedures," explanations of
methodology, "and discussion of excluded results.""2 The four
dissenters would require that the government strictly adhere to
Central Hudson's burden, as modified by Edenfield's "direct and
material" requirement: "[t]he general rule is that the speaker and the
audience, not the government, assess the value of the information
presented."'"
E. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island1
In 1996, a plurality of the Supreme Court cast serious doubt on
the commercial/noncommercial distinction in the context of a State's
blanket ban on advertising liquor prices. The fractured Court garnered
122. Id. at 1595-96.
123. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
124. Id. at 2381.
125. See generally P. Cameron De Vore & Robert D. Sack, Communications Law 1996:
Advertising and Commercial Speech, 462 PLI 371, 798-834 (1996).
126. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2377. The Court also noted that the government's factual basis
was not refuted. Id. at 2378.
127. Id. at 2384.
128. Id. at 2386 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
129. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
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a majority only for its holdings that Rhode Island's blanket ban on
liquor price advertising violated the First Amendment m and that the
Twenty-First Amendment did not provide authority for the State's
abridgment of otherwise protected speech.l Justice Stevens' plurality
opinion, however, was devoid of any express application of Central
Hudson, and its rationale was couched in terms broadly protective of
commercial speech. Additionally, Justice Thomas, concurring, argued
explicitly for eradicating the commercial/noncommercial distinction. M3
Rhode Island enacted a statutory scheme prohibiting: (1) the
advertisement of liquor prices, except for displays and price tags
within licensed premises which were not visible from outside the
premises, and (2) the "publication or broadcast" of any
advertisements referring to liquor prices.'33 The state imposed a fine
on 44 Liquormart, a liquor store, for violating the statute. 44
Liquormart paid the fine, but sought a declaratory judgment that the
statute violated the First Amendment. 134
The District Court declared the advertising ban unconstitutional
because the ban did not "directly advance the state's purported
interest in reducing alcohol consumption." 135 The Court of Appeals
reversed, deferring to the legislature's judgment that the statute would
decrease competitive pricing, thereby driving up prices and reducing
alcohol consumption.3 6
The Supreme Court's opinions in 44 Liquormart reveal more
directly that which the 1995 Court implied in Coors: at least four
Justices can no longer keep a straight face in relegating commercial
speech to second-class status. Nor could a majority figure out how
Posadas fits into the commercial speech puzzle.
In the principal opinion written on behalf of himself and a
fluctuating plurality throughout, Justice Stevens dismissed any
purported justification for maintaining dimished protection for
commercial speech:
When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers
from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires
the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its
130. Id. at 1515.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1518
133. Id. at 1501.
134. Id. at 1503.
135. Id. at 1501.
136. Id. at 1503.
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regulation is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional
protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies less than
strict review. However, when a State entirely prohibits the
dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for
reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process,
there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the
First Amendment generally demands.1'7
Speaking for himself and Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, Justice
Stevens rejected the proposition that "commonsense distinctions"
exist between commercial and noncommercial speech,' and asserted
that "[t]he First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of
regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the
government perceives to be their own good."'39
The Stevens plurality picked up Justice Thomas for its analysis of
Rhode Island's blanket ban against liquor price advertising which the
plurality described as "truthful, nonmisleading speech about a lawful
product."'1 The plurality analyzed the ban in terms resembling the
intermediate scrutiny standard, but neither cited Central Hudson nor
expressly applied its framework. The plurality rejected Rhode Island's
assertion that the price advertising ban would significantly advance the
State's interest in promoting temperance because the State had not
proffered any evidence supporting the proposition that higher prices
yield less consumption. 4' "[S]peculation certainly does not suffice
when the State takes aim at accurate commercial information for
paternalistic ends."'42 The plurality also deemed Rhode Island's ban
more extensive than necessary because the State could achieve its
purported goal of promoting temparance through other alternatives,
such as direct regulation, taxation, and educational campaigns.
143
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsberg also rejected
the State's arguments that Posadas supported the advertising ban.
137. Id. at 1507 (emphasis added). In this section of the opinion, Part IV, Stevens was joined
by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg.
138. Id. See also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc., 507 U.S. 412, 428 (1993)
(disparaging rhetoric emphasizing distinctions between commercial and noncommercial speech
and declaring city's blanket ban on commercial newsracks unconstitutional).
139. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1508.
140. Id. at 1508.
141. Id. at 1509. "Although the record suggests that the price advertising ban may have some
impact on the purchasing patterns of temperate drinkers of modest means, . . . the State has
presented no evidence to suggest that its speech prohibition will significantly reduce market-wide
consumption." Id.
142. Id. at 1510.
143. Id.
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Rhode Island argued that under Posadas, the State enjoys legislative
deference because it could have banned the sale of alcoholic beverages
outright. The four Justices declared that while Posadas would support
that argument, Posadas applied an erroneous First Amendment
analysis:
The reasoning in Posadas does support the State's argument, but, on
reflection, we are now persuaded that Posadas erroneously
performed the First Amendment analysis. . . Given our
longstanding hostility to commercial speech regulation of this type,
Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was 'up to the legislature'
to choose suppression over a less speech-restrictive policy. The
Posadas majority's conclusion on that point cannot be reconciled
with the unbroken line of prior cases striking down similarly broad
regulations in truthful, nonmisleadin advertising when non-speech-
related alternatives were availalable.
Joined with the separate opinions by Justices Thomas 45 and
O'Connor,1 6 Posadas has been effectively overruled as an aberration
in First Amendment jurisprudence.
The plurality rejected the greater-includes-the-lesser argument-
which accords a legislature deference in choosing to abridge speech
about a product that it could directly regulate or ban outright-as
"inconsistent with both logic and well-settled doctrine."'47 The
plurality noted that under the First Amendment, direct regulation of a
product is less restrictive than curtailing speech about that product,
and, therefore, Posadas' greater-includes-the-lesser logic was
erroneous. The plurality also rejected the State's argument that
commercial speech regarding a "vice" activity enjoys less protection
than other commercial speech regarding less controversial activity."4
Justice Thomas concurred in the result, but dissented from the
principal opinion's application of a balancing test for commercial
speech.149 Justice Thomas would eradicate the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech and afford commercial speech
full First Amendment protection. His reasons are highly persuasive.
First, practically all advertising bans would fail Central Hudson's
144. Id. at 1511 (citations omitted).
145. Id. at 1515 (Thomas, J., concuring).
146. Id. at 1520 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 1512.
148. Id. at 1513. The plurality noted that Coors effectively rejected any "vice" exception to
commercial speech doctrine, and that such an exception "would be difficult, if not impossible, to
define." Id.
149. Id. at 1518.
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fourth prong because direct regulation or banning of a product, taxing,
or price control devices would always be as effective as discouraging
consumption by restricting advertising.15 Additionally, the state could
never meet its burden because any calculus showing the effect of
speech regulation is inherently unattainable and imprecise. "[T]he
Central Hudson test asks the courts to weigh the incommensurables-
the value of knowledge versus the value of ignorance-and to apply
contradictory premises-that informed adults are the best judges of
their own interests, and that they are not."' 51 Furthermore, Justice
Thomas doubted the ability to discern commercial from
noncommercial speech.152 Justice Thomas would therefore overrule
Central Hudson and afford commercial speech the full measure of
protection under the First Amendment. 153
Justice Scalia shared Justice Thomas' disdain for Central Hudson.
He, however, found that the Court lacked any basis for disturbing
Central Hudson's framework because Rhode Island's ban was
unconstitutional under it, thus mooting any arguments for modifying
existing law.5 4'
Justice O'Connor, concurring on behalf of herself, Chief Justice
Renquist, and Justices Souter and Breyer, agreed that Rhode Island's
advertising ban was unconstitutional, but, purportedly in
contradistinction to Justice Stevens' plurality, would preserve Central
Hudson's intermediate scrutiny standard.-5
44 Liquormart is decisive on few points: that Rhode Island's ban
was unconstitutional; that Posadas is overruled;'56 and that the
150. Id. at 1518-19. There are two exceptions to this assumption. First, where a government
has no power to directly regulate a product or activity because the underlying activity is
constitutionally protected, the less restrictive means of direct regulation is unavailable. Id. at
1519 n.7. For example, if the Second Amendment was read to preclude the states from
prohibiting the possession of guns, a State could arguably satisfy Central Hudson because it lacks
the lesser restrictive alternative to chilling speech, e.g., direct regulation. Second, when the sale of
the product occurs outside the State's borders, the State is similarly devoid of jurisdiction to
regulate the activity. Id.
151. Id. at 1520.
152. Id. at 1517.
153. Id. at 1518.
154. Id. at 1515.
155. Id. at 1521.
156. Accord Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir, 1996)[hereinafter
Anheuser-Busch II/(Butzner, J., dissenting)(noting "[a]t least seven members of the Court
expressly decided not to follow Posadas, concluding that a legislature's decision to suppress
commercial speech, even if reasonable, is not entitled to deference."); but see Nordyke v. County
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Supreme Court cannot agree on the standard by which to analyze
commercial speech regulation.' Amusingly, Justices O'Connor and
Thomas could not even agree on whether Justice Stevens' principal
opinion applied Central Hudson's framework in the first place.L%
While a careful reading of the principal opinion suggests that Justice
Stevens applied the intermediate scrutiny standard-analyzing the
state's interest,m assessing whether the State's regulation was "no
more extensive than necessary,"1 ° and citing alternatives to regulating
speech161 -this point of contention illustrates the degree of confusion
and fracture within the Supreme Court as to the state of the
commercial speech doctrine. This uncertainty harms not only lower
courts struggling to prevent reversal on appeal, but real people who
must make real decisions within the law. The Court's lack of consensus
sustains the same reprehensible impact on society as does Central
Hudson itself-unpredictability. Neither non-consensus nor an
imprecise, ad hoc balancing test are acceptable. The Court should
therefore raise the constitutional protection of commercial speech
commensurate with that provided political speech.
II
President Clinton's Regulation of Tobacco Advertising
On August 10, 1995 President Clinton issued a proposal to
regulate tobacco advertising via the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) for the purpose of preventing "aggressive[] market[ing] to our
young people."162 Nearly one year later, the FDA declared nicotine a
of Santa Clara, 933 F. Supp. 903, 908 (N.D. Cal. 1996)(finding 44 Liquormart did not overrule
Posadas).
157. Anheuser-Busch 11, 101 F.3d at 328 (construing 44 Liquormart narrowly because "no
opinion adressing the First Amendment violation commanded a majority of the Court."). In
Anheuser-Busch II, the Fourth Circuit decided whether Baltimore City's ordinance designed to
promote temperance of minors prohibiting outdoor liquor advertisements violated the First
Amendment. The court upheld the ordinance and distinguished 44 Liquormart on several
grounds. For a criticism of the Fourth Circuit's application of Central Hudson in light of 44
Liquormart, see supra, text accompanying Part III.B.2.
158. Justice Thomas declared, "I do not join the principal opinion's application of the
Central Hudson balancing test," 116 S. Ct. at 1518 (Thomas, J., concuring), while Justice
O'Connor noted, "I agree with the Court that Rhode Island's price-advertising ban is invalid. I
would resolve this case more narrowly, however, by applying our established Central Hudson
test." Id. at 1521 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 1508.
160. Id. at 1510.
161. Id.
162. Fox, supra note 12, at 13.
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drug and imposed strict limits on tobacco advertising.' 13 Along with
other restrictions, the new regulations' 1 would: (1) "[limit all outdoor
and in-store advertising of cigarettes to black-and-white text except in
adult-only facilities 'totally inaccessible to persons under 18;"' 1 (2)
"[a]llow only black-and-white text advertising of cigarettes in
publications with significant youth readership, including People, Sports
Illustrated, Car and Driver, Rolling Stone, and Glamour;"166 (3)
"[p]rohibit cigarette brand names on hats, T-shirts and back-packs;" 167
and (4) "[b]an billboards advertising cigarettes within 1,000 feet of
schools and playgrounds."" c
Clinton's proposal has sparked vehement debate, and has
motivated both proponents and opponents to search for empirical data
regarding the effect of tobacco advertising on children3l Such data is
crucial under the current intermediate scrutiny test because the
government must satisfy its burden of showing that its regulation will,
in a direct and material way, advance its interest in curbing tobacco
use. 17 Moreover, the government must show that other less restrictive
means of achieving that goal are insufficient.
Tobacco is an easy target for advertising regulation. The Surgeon
General idenitifies smoking as the number one preventable cause of
death in the United States.171 It is single-handedly responsible for
nearly 434,000 deaths per year. 2 It affects the global health system
and insurance premiums, and it kills our loved ones. Because tobacco
is generally considered potentially the most evil legal product on the
163. Loraine Woellert, Clinton Unveils Sweeping Tobacco Curbs; Cigarette Firms Challenge
FDA in Court, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1996, at Al. The regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 44615 (1996)(to
be codified at 21 CFR § 897), are scheduled to take effect by the end of August 1997. Id.
164. This Note focuses on Clinton's ban as an example of many pending or enacted tobacco
advertising regulations on both the federal and state levels. For other proposed regulations, see,
for example, Drugs: Ford Offers Legislative Alternative to FDA Regulation of Tobacco Products,
BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Sept. 21, 1995, at d7; Comment, Up In Smoke, supra note 14, at 703-
04 n.2.
165. Woellert, supra note 163, at Al.
166. Id. "Significant" is defined as greater than fifteen percent youth readership or greater
than two million young readers. Id.
167. Id.
16& Id.
169. See, e.g., Marlene Cimons, Smoking, Illegal Drug Use Still Rising Among Teens National
Survey Shows, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1995, at 25.
170. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,767 (1993).
171. Carchman, supra note 17, at 89.
1721 Id. (citing Centers for Disease Control, Smoking-Attributable Mortality and Years of
Potential Life Lost, 40 MORTALITY & MORBIDITY WKLY. REV. 62 (1991)).
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American market, it is the perfect lens through which the importance
of speech-including commercial speech-can be observed.
The acceptability of tobacco advertising regulation at first glance,
solely based on tobacco's harmful effects, detracts from the focus of
First Amendment protection. The potential snowball effect of
paternalism under the guise of protectionism would become a
troubling reality if government regulation of tobacco advertising is
sanctioned. Practically every product in the marketplace has a
potentially harmful component-sugar, fat, sodium, saccharin,
caffeine, and so forth. While such products-including tobacco-are
often subject to advertising regulation requiring affirmative disclosure
of the risks associated with the products, 173 consumers have always
made the final assessment, namely, whether or not the benefits of the
product outweigh the risks. A consumer's choice regarding tobacco is
no different,174 except, potentially, for the addictive nature of the
product which may negate a true "choice" in consumerism. Addiction
pervades the marketplace, however, and should not be accepted as a
justification for commercial speech regulation in the context of
tobacco where other preferred products, such as caffeine and alcohol,
are exempted, despite their similar characteristics. Moreover, the
addictive nature of tobacco is disclosed on all tobacco products and
advertisements under mandate of federal law. Therefore, tobacco
speech is not misleading with respect to addictiveness. 175
III
Argument
A. The Supreme Court Should Eradicate the Illusory
Commercial/Noncommercial Speech Dichotomy
The commercial/noncommercial speech dichotomy is illusory,
undefinable, based on erroneous assumptions, and should be
eradicated. In order to understand why the distinction is illusory and
undefinable, it is important to first consider what the Supreme Court
has meant by "commercial speech."
173. See infra text accompanying notes 213-214
174. Professor Redish calls this conundrum, "reverse dilution," and warns that if the
government is permitted to regulate tobacco advertising on the basis that consumers cannot be
trusted in making individual decisions, "it is difficult to see how government could be denied the
exact same power when political choices are involved." Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising
and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589, 606 (1996).
175. Id. at 609.
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1. The Supreme Court's "Definition" of Commercial Speech Cannot Be
Applied in Cases Beyond Those Proposing Simple Quid Pro Quo
Exchanges
The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as speech
which "proposes a commercial transaction. '" 176 On the flipside, the
Court has excluded the following factors as irrelevant in classifying
commercial speech as such: (1) whether the speech is sold for profit;77
(2) whether the speech solicits money;7 8 and (3) whether the
underlying subject matter is commercial in nature.7 These exclusions
result both from the Supreme Court's recognition that the speaker's
motive is not a factor and the fact that dual aspect speech
encompassing political dialogue regarding commercial matters
deserves the higher First Amendment protection afforded political
speech.'
The clearest example of "pure" commercial speech is that which
was litigated in Virginia Pharmacy Board. In that case, the State
prohibited pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription
drugs.'8 The advertisement at issue did not imply a political message
and the speaker's motive was indisputably profit-oriented, resembling
the simple proposal, "I will sell to you ten widgets for three dollars."
The Court recognized the advertisement as "purely commercial
speech."' '
Most advertisements, however, are not as direct or solely
commercial in nature. Consider, for example, the dairy industry's
creative "Got Milk?" advertising campaign. Variations of the print ads
depict deliciously tempting cakes and cookies with a simple statement:
"Got Milk?" In the television commercials, snackers are portrayed in
the unenviable predicament of having their cake and eating it, too-
176. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rights, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973).
177. Obviously, this exclusion is necessary because otherwise protected political speech
memorialized in a book sold for profit could subject political speech to regulation as commercial
speech. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19 at 638; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
178. Similarly, this exclusion recognizes the overlap of political and commercial speech. This
exclusion protects political organizations seeking contributions to fund their political purpose. Id.
See also Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 763.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 640.
181. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 749-50.
182. Id.
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but without milk. These advertisements do not fit squarely within the
Court's definition of commercial speech because there is no express
invitation to purchase the product. While at first glance no one would
doubt that the dairy industry's motive for the speech is to sell its
product, as discussed above, the speaker's motive is irrelevant. 183
Moreover, this apparent motive overlooks the fact that every product
on the market contains a potentially political component.
In fact, it is usually a third-party such as a public interest group or
a governmental entity which ."politicizes" the product. For example,
following a protest by vegetarians criticizing consumer purchases of
meat and fur, companies selling those products regularly address those
politics in counter-advertising designed to both sell a product and state
a political counter-message. 184 Similarly, consider the following
hypothetical competitive campaign among the chicken industry.
Following criticism of "inhumane" chicken-raising practices, some
chicken producers advertise that they did not employ such practices,
implying that their politically incorrect competitors did so. While the
seller's political counter-speech in these examples may aim at an
ultimate commercial goal, the content of the speech itself-which is
the sole factor in classifying speech-is inherently political.
Tobacco advertising is a prime example of this overlap between
politics and commercialism. Consider the case of In Re R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co.,1" where R.J. Reynolds printed an advertisement
disputing a health study showing that smoking causes heart disease.
The advertisement challenged the study's methodology, and read,
"We at R.J. Reynolds do not claim this study proves that smoking
doesn't cause heart disease. But we do wish to make a
point. . . . [T]he controversy over smoking and health remains an
open one. ''""6 Although the FTC erroneously characterized R.J.
Reynolds' speech as commercial (the error lay in the FTC's reliance
183. See supra text accompanying notes 176-180.
184. See generally Ad War Brewing, SEATrLE TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at El (discussing
advertising wars between beer companies and State government).
185. Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,385, at 23,467 (1986), rev'd, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
22,522 at 22,180 (1980), stay denied, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) [ 22,54, at 22,231 (1988), cited in
DeVore & Sack, supra note 125, at 504-07. The FTC determined that R.J. Reynold's speech was
"commercial" and therefore subject to more permissive regulation. DeVore & Sack, supra note
125, at 504-07. While this finding was clearly erroneous because the FTC based its determination
on R.J. Reynold's economic motive, the parties entered into a consent decree, preempting any
further review. See id.
186. Id.
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on the speaker's motive), the advertisement clearly contained political
language.
In another controversy, Phillip Morris responded to a
congressional ban on television advertisements of cigarettes by
releasing commercials "discuss[ing] the importance of the Bill of
Rights to our way of life and encourag[ing] viewers to become
acquainted with its provisions."1" The ad neither depicted nor
discussed anything regarding cigarettes, but merely displayed the
Phillip Morris logo and offered free copies of the Bill of Rights to
viewers. 1 Commercial or political?
Politics surrounding current efforts to regulate tobacco raise the
identical problem. The relatively recent war against tobacco has
sparked massive advertising and counter-advertising between
governments-both federal and state-and the tobacco companies.',
While the first tobacco ads ever produced may have been solely to
propose a commercial transaction-in both motive and substance,
tobacco has evolved into one of the hottest and most controversial
political issues.'1 For example, where libertarian political groups join
with tobacco companies to lobby against government regulation,'9' the
simple, commonly-visible advertisement with the word "Marlboro"
can no longer be deemed purely commercial, because the name has
become associated with a political crusade. Thus, the government
inevitably creates for itself a catch-22: a product may be born purely
commercial; the government endeavors to regulate it; the seller is
coerced into the political arena; and finally, the seller's advertisements
187. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 644. The authors cite this controversy to illustrate
the same problem discussed here, namely, the difficulty in discerning whether dual aspect speech
(which Judge Kozinski calls "advertorials") is commercial or political. Id. See also From Diets to
Underwear, 10 Ads Were Real Turkeys, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 5, 1990, at 1E (describing
Phillip Morris' campaign as "a new low even for cigarettes manufacturers.")
18& Id.
189. See generally Mae M. Cheng, Lighting Some Fires ... Going After Underage
Smokers, Stores, NEWSDAY, Dec. 16, 1996, at A4; Laruel Shackelford, Needed: A More Aggressive
Battle Against Teen Smoking, COURIER-J., Nov. 19, 1995, at 2D; Stuart Elliott, Uncle Sam Is No
Match for the Marlboro Man, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1995, at 3-1.
190. See generally Ron Scherer, Tobacco Firms Face a Pack of Lawsuits in '97, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIE., Dec. 13, 1996, at A-38 (describing debate over sale and regulation of tobacco
products as "hot political issue").
191. Mike Brown, Critics Say Tobacco Seeks FDA Overhaul But GOP Denies An Industry
Role, COURIER-J., April 20, 1996, at 1A (describing how both conservative and libertarian think
tanks have joined tobacco companies in their challenge to prospective regulation).
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intertwine both commercialism and politics.192 Advertisements of a
"post-politicized" product serve more than the single purpose of
"proposing a commercial transaction" and, therefore, cannot be
regulated according to the lesser standard applied to commercial
speech cases-even under current law. And while a Marlboro
advertisement identical to the one in Virginia Pharmacy Board could
arguably be characterized as purely commercial, rest assured that
tobacco companies will rise to the challenge of intertwining their
political and commercial ambitions to circumvent the purely
commercial speech category.
2. So-Called "Distinguishing Characteristics" of Commercial Speech
Do Not Justify Lesser Constitutional Protection
The Court has identified the following distinguishing
characteristics of commercial speech: (1) that commercial speech is
more objectively verifiable; and (2) that commercial speech, the
offspring of economic self-interest, is supposedly a hardy breed of
expression that is not particularly susceptible to being crushed by
overbroad regulation."' 13 Justice Thomas has criticized these
distinctions as meaningless: "[N]either of these rationales provides any
basis for permitting the government to keep citizens ignorant as a
means of manipulating their choices in the commercial or political
marketplace."1" Justice Blackmun similarly rejected the proposition
that "commonsense differences" between commercial and
noncommercial speech justify the two-tiered approach. 95 Recognizing
that the definition of commercial speech cannot be applied in most
cases, Judge Kozinski of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recently analyzed whether the commercial/noncommercial distinction
is justifiable because of the distinguishing characteristics of
commercial speech and concluded that the proffered distinctions do
not justify the dichotomy."9
192. See also Jeff I. Richards, Politicizing Cigarette Advertising, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1147,
1151 (1996) (noting anti-smoking forces "have made tobacco advertising into a major political
issue, effectively transfroming it into 'political speech.').
193. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1518 n.4 (1996)(Thomas, J.,
concurring)(citation omitted).
194. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
195. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 578
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
196. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 648.
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The first distinction is based on the premise that a listener can
more readily determine the truth of commercial speech. While this
assumption is true for simple cases where the seller proclaims,
"widgets cost one dollar," most advertising is indirect, suggestive, and
rhetorical. Concordantly, Judge Kozinski argues: "[N]ot all
commercial speech is so objective. What about the statement 'America
is turning 7-Up?' Is that true? How would you tell?" 197 Similar
examples pervade the advertising industry. Is it true that nobody can
eat just one "Lay's" potato chip? Are green M&Ms a sexual
stimulant? Are Jeep Cherokee owners fun-loving and rugged? The
point is straight-forward: modern advertising is more sophisticated
and suggestive and therefore eludes any objectively verifiable
component which may have persisted in traditional advertising.",
The second distinction is premised on the idea that a commercial
speaker will not be side-lined by regulation because his or her profit
incentive will inspire competitive measures to circumvent the potential
pitfalls of speech regulation. The Supreme Court, however, has made
clear that the speaker's motive is not a factor in classifying speech as
commercial or noncommercial."9 The assumption that the speaker's
profit motive renders his or her speech more durable is directly
inapposite to this principle. Moreover, in an industry such as the
tobacco business, where an entire industry is faced with the prospect
of imminent dissolution, either by regulation or by bankruptcy
resulting from protracted massive litigation, speech may be its only
tool with which to save itself. Thus, as Justice Brennan has stated,
"[n]o differences between commercial and other kinds of speech
justify protecting commercial speech less extensively where ...the
government seeks to manipulate private behavior by depriving the
citizens of truthful information concerning lawful activities."
Even if these distinctions were logically sound, they do not imply
a justification for the paternalistic manipulation of information in the
197. Id. at 635.
198. Id.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 177-180.
200. Posadas De Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 351 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574-75 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)(Justice Blackmun argued: "Even though 'commercial' speech is involved,
[advertising regulation] strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. This is because it is a covert
attempt by the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens, not by persuasion or direct
regulation, but by depriving the public of the information needed to make a free choice.").
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marketplace.m1 In fact, the most logical reason why the government
would want to curtail the free flow of commercial information is that
the government has reached a political compromise in fear of the
political backlash that direct regulation would create. 2m The present
tobacco controversy demands such a compromise. Could the President
and Congress realistically threaten the demise of an entire industry
netting $2.74 billion annually?m The tobacco industry would likely
view substantial political contributions as a sound investment to
sustain profitability, wouldn't it? Moreover, the government would not
quickly resolve to render thousands of tobacco company employees
unemployed. In reality, then, President Clinton's efforts to regulate
tobacco advertising seem the result of a political compromise aimed at
avoiding the political backlash which would arise out of direct
regulation.2 Accordingly, the Supreme Court's traditional
distinctions between commercial and noncommercial speech are
suspect at best, and are certainly inapplicable in the context of tobacco
advertising regulation.
3. The Government Has No Interest In Curtailing Truthful,
Non-Misleading Speech-Whether or Not Commercial in Nature
The free market economy in the United States depends on the
free flow of information. The system is based on the premise that
consumers will evaluate commercial information and make informed
decisions.' As a result, high demand products are perpetuated, while
low demand products are driven out. While this simple description of
201. 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1518 n.4 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
202. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574-75 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Posadas, 478 U.S. at 351
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
203. Carchman, supra note 17, at 89.
204. Karl Vick, Smoking Out Noncompliance in Teen Tobacco Crackdown, WASH. POST,
Mar. 1, 1997, at B1 (noting political consultant Dick Morris recounted President Clinton "was
initially wary of alligning himself against tobacco out of fear that it would hurt him in southern
states").
205. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 763-65 (1976)(noting "free flow" of comparative advertising is "indispensable" in free
market system); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977)(noting "[a]dvertising is
the traditional mechanism in a free market economy for a supplier to inform a potential
purchaser of the availability and terms of exchange."); Licata & Co. v. Goldberg, 812 F. Supp.
403, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)(recognizing "[r]obust debate between competitors on matters of
opinion, and claims that one product or service is far superior to that of rivals, are encouraged as
part of the hurly-burly inherent in a free market system and indeed an open society.").
19971 SEEING BEYOND THE SMOKE AND MIRRORS
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
the economy may seem obvious and elementary, the integral role of
information or commercial speech cannot be overstated.0
Consider the effect of information in commerce. Where company
X sells high-fat, over-priced potato chips with statistically proven low
satisfaction, its competitor, Y, would likely wish to inform prospective
consumers that its potato chips, in comparison to X's, are lower in fat,
cheaper, and have a high statistical consumer satisfaction ratio. Such
competitive advertising pervades the media. The effect of such
advertising is beneficial both to consumers and to Y. While X may be
detrimentally affected, competitive forces will drive X either to
improve its product or to fade away. So the free market system
flourishes, protecting both consumers and the economy by maximizing
quality and minimizing the exploitation of profit by monopoly.7
Now consider the same scenario without such competitive
information. The busy consumer stops at a supermarket and, not
having four spare hours to siphon through vast information on potato
chip bags, grabs either the cheapest or the most attractively packaged
bag of chips. Under this system, the commercial survivors are selected
at random, irrespective of comparative quality or pricing. Accordingly,
both the free market and the consumer suffer."
Of course, while the above hypothetical exemplifies the utility of
information in commerce, this truism can only survive if the
information is truthful and neither fraudulent nor deceptive.
Obviously, this is because consumer reliance on false information by
definition precludes the consumer from making an informed decision.
Accordingly, consumer laws in the United States have perpetuated the
exchange of truthful information regarding products-at times even
affirmatively requiring manufacturers to provide consumers with
information necessary to make an informed decision-while
preventing the exchange of false or misleading information.'
206. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 1.6, at 36-39
(1989)(noting imperfect competition is facilitated "[i]f one group of buyers does not know
enough about . . . the content of the product"); id. at § 1.1, at 1-14.
207. See id.
208. See Cass R. Sunstein, Disrupting Voluntary Transactions, in MARKETS AND JUSTICE, 279-
302 (1989)(noting government intervention in free market "may make things worse rather than
better").
209. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(noting Supreme Court has
"consistently invalidated restrictions designed to deprive consumers of accurate information
about products and services legally offered for sale.")(citations omitted).
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The government has long prohibited the dissemination of false
and misleading information in the commercial context. 210 For example,
trademark law prohibits the deceptive utilization of a competitor's
name or symbol, thus protecting consumers from confusion as to the
seller and its reputation.2 " Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission
Act prohibits false and misleading advertising.2" Again, such statutes
further the goal of ensuring that consumers have sufficiently truthful
information to make informed decisions.
Consumer statutes require the disclosure of truthful information
regarding certain products, as well. For example, the Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act of 19 9 0211 requires that food and
beverage packages contain specific nutritional information, including
fat and calorie content. In the spirit of informing consumers, Congress
has required similar disclosures for tobacco products. In the Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act,2 4 Congress described its goal as
assuring that "the public may be adequately informed" about the
health risks of cigarette smoking and required warning notices on
cigarette packages and advertisements. Thus, consistent with those
laws which prohibit false and misleading advertising, labelling laws
further the common goal of informing consumers by disseminating
truthful information.
Absent from this scheme, however, is any recognition of a
governmental interest in prohibiting the dissemination of truthful
210. For an in-depth discussion regarding the relationship between the First Amendment
and false advertising, see Richard M. Schmidt, Jr. and Robert Clifton Bums, Symposium:
Commercial Speech and The First Amendment: Proof or Consequences: False Advertising and the
Doctrine of Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1273 (1988).
211. The Federal Lanham Act provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or serviecs, or any container for
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false
or misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services,
or commercial activities by another person [is subject to civil liaiblity].
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994).
212. The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) prohibits false and misleading advertising.
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). For a case-by-case overview of the FTCA, see DeVore & Sack, supra note
125, at 590-602.
213. 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1994). While this Note does not purport to provide an exhaustive list or
discussion of disclosure statutes, such statutes pervade consumer laws. See, e.g., Truth in Lending
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994); Alcoholic Beverage Labelling Act, 27 U.S.C. § 215 (1994).
214. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
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information regarding legal products.215 The reason is simple: the
government has no legitimate interest. While, as discussed above, the
government may seek a political compromise in regulating advertising
rather than directly regulating the product, the government should not
be able to coerce disclosure of certain information to purportedly
benefit consumers, and then prevent others from responding. Such a
result is hypocritical, paternalistic, and violative of the First
Amendment because, as discussed above, direct regulation is less
restrictive, for First Amendment purposes, than speech regulation.
B. Alternatively, President Clinton's Proposed Ban is Unconstitutional
Applying Central Hudson's Intermediate Scrutiny Standard
1. Applying Central Hudson
Clinton's proposed regulation of tobacco advertising fails the less
stringent intermediate scrutiny test of Central Hudson, as well.216 This
realization is critical, assuming that the Clinton administration's true
interest is battling tobacco itself to prevent health crises, rather than
politicizing a hot topic for good press.217 Because the proposal is
clearly unconstitutional under current standards-irrespective of the
reform proffered above-the Clinton administration should endeavor
to create more realistic solutions to the tobacco health crisis. Such
solutions could include: (1) creating a tobacco consumer statute,
including class action provisions, attorneys fees, punitive damages, or
other incentives to make the tobacco industry accountable for its
actions; (2) counter-speech campaigns to reduce smoking; (3) taxes on
215. Concurring in Central Hudson, Justice Blackmun stated: "Permissible restraints on
commercial speech have been limited to measures designed to protect consumers from
fraudulent, misleading, or coercive sales techniques. Those designed to deprive consumers of
information about products or services that are legally offered for sale consistently have been
invalidated." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
574 (1980) (citations omitted).
216. The Fourth Circuit has upheld against First Amendment challenges a city ordinance
prohibiting tobacco billboards. Penn Adver., Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318, 1326 (4th
Cir. 1995). For an analysis and critique of that decision, see Johnson, supra note 62. For an
analysis of the Fourth Circuit's decision after remand, see 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996), for
determination in light of 44 Liquormart, see infra text accompanying notes 256-277.
217. First Amendment lawyers have criticized: "Politics is what's going on here, despite
painfully obvious First Amendment problems." Richard Cavelli Constitution Cited As Blocking
Rules on Cigarette Ads, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 7, 1996, at A3. See also Claudia McLachlan,
Tobacco's Road is Smooth: FDA Regs Face Legal Fight, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 9, 1996, at B1 (stating
"[a]bout the only thing everyone agrees on in the contentious debate over government regulation
of cigarettes is the Clinton administration's brilliant political timing in releasing its final tobacco
regulations.").
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tobacco to decrease demand; or (4) the sociological extreme solution
of tobacco prohibition. While this list is not suggested as an
exhaustive, or even a realistic, solution to the tobacco crisis, it
illustrates that President Clinton has circumvented the tougher issues
by taking aim at speech which is constitutionally protected even under
Central Hudson.
Under Central Hudson's first prong, tobacco advertising is
protectable so long as the content is truthful, not misleading, and
relates to a legal activity. 18 While proponents of the ban argue that
tobacco advertisements are misleading because they depict a healthy
life-style among smokers 19 advertising campaigns such as Joe Camel
and the rugged Marlboro horseman cannot be subverted under this
prong because such a result would re-invent the advertising industry
and render unconstitutional practically every modern advertisement
ever published. Suggestive advertising is simply not implicated under
Central Hudson's first prong.m Moreover, tobacco's ill effects are
mandatorily disclosed by law, thereby precluding any deceptive or
misleading component of tobacco advertising. 21
The second prong of the test requires that the government assert
a substantial interest in regulating tobacco advertising.'m Prior to
Coors, the Court had generally applied a substantially diminished
prong-two burden (if any) upon the state, most often finding a
substantial governmental interest. 2 3 In Coors, the Court continued its
deferential approach to prong two, stating it had "no reason to think
that strength wars, if they were to occur, would not produce the type
of social harm that the Government hopes to prevent."' A majority
in 44 Liquormart similarly nodded its head at the State's purported
interest in promoting temperance, but this deference is likely the
218. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
219. President Clinton has accused tobacco companies of displaying misleading ads
"show[ing] rugged men and glamorous women lighting up and blissful couples sharing their
cigarettes." Fox, supra note 12, at 13. Other authorities have made similar claims. Weber &
Marks, supra note 14, at 70. Such a claim is meritless, however, because the general nature of
advertising is to depict a product's users as happy with the product. See id.
220. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 635-36.
221. See infra text accompanying notes 244-245.
222. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
223. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the State Univ. N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989);
Posadas De Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986).
224. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1591 (1995). See also Florida Bar v. Went
For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2376 (1995)("We have little trouble crediting the Bar's interest as
substantial.").
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result of two aspects of prong-two analysis.2 First, a state's interest or
motive can rarely be contradicted-it is what the state says it is.
Second, the regulation is much more easily challenged under the third
and fourth prongs, where the state has the burden of validating the
correlation between the regulation and its effect on the targeted state
interest.
Because Clinton's ban purportedly aims at protecting children, a
prong-two analysis requires an analysis of whether that interest would
warrant more deference than otherwise accorded. While the Court
could likely recognize the state's interest in protecting children
because the underlying activity, e.g., selling tobacco to minors, is
illegal, the regulation would have to be quite narrow to fit this
rationale.' This is because the Court has struck down regulations
which prohibit advertising to adults, using a purported goal of
protecting children as a pretext.m In Bolger, the state argued that its
interest in protecting children justified its ban on unsolicited mailing of
advertisements for contraceptives.m The Court rejected this claim,
stating that "parents must already cope with the multitude of external
stimuli that color their children's perception of sensitive
subjects. . . . The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot
be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox."'  Under
Bolger, then, the government's interest in protecting children from
tobacco advertising could reasonably be deemed overbroad because it
reaches media which is directed at both children and adults.'
Under prong three, the government has the burden of showing
that regulating tobacco advertising would, in a "direct and material
225. 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1509, 1521 (1996).
226. Redish, supra note 174, at 607-08.
227. Bolger v. Yangs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 73-74 (emphasis added).
230. Redish, supra note 174, at 608 (arguing "[while] restrictions on tobacco advertising
within a certain distance of a school or playground are constitutional, . . . more general
restrictions on tobacco advertising cannot constitutionally be regulated on the grounds that
minors will also be exposed to it. To allow such restrictions would be to reduce all of society to a
community of children for purposes of the First Amendment."). But see FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 746-49 (1978)(upholding partial ban of specified "filthy words" on broadcast radio
during hours when children are likely listening); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v.
FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 4261, at *137 (Kennedy, J., concurring)(noting in First
Amendment indecency analysis, "Congress . . . [has] a compelling interest in protecting
children from indecent speech . . . . So long as society gives proper respect to parental choices,
it may, under an appropriate standard, intervene to spare children exposure to material not
suitable for minors.").
way," reduce tobacco use by children. 31 In 44 Liquormart, the Stevens
plurality rejected Rhode Island's unsubstantiated claim that its
prohibition on advertisements stating the price of liquor would raise
prices and reduce consumption. The plurality demanded a State
showing that the regulation would advance its interest, "to a material
degree" under Edenfield. The Court demanded specific findings of
specific results, and warned: "[S]peculation certainly does not suffice
when the State takes aim at accurate commercial information for
paternalistic ends." 32
Moreover, while the Court has fluctuated in the quantum of
evidence required,' Coors and 44 Liquormart severely undermine-if
not overrule-Posadas' deferential approach to prong three.,,, Coors
reversed the government's labeling ban because the government failed
to offer "convincing evidence" that a labeling ban effectuated a
reduction in strength wars. Despite a positive correlation showing that
the government achieved its goal through its ban, the Court was
unwilling to assume that the regulation caused the reduction without
hard data corrobrating such claimed causation. 3 The Coors Court's
analysis essentially defines Edenfield's "direct and material" test in
terms of an evidentiary requirement 237 and evinces a clear choice by
the Supreme Court to strictly enforce the regulator's burden of
proof.? While Posadas dimished a legislature's prong-three burden of
showing with conclusive evidence that its regulation will effect a
contemplated change, Posadas can no longer be cited for the
proposition that speech related to a harmful but legal activity is
entitled to less protection than other protectable commercial speech
under the First Amendment merely because the government could
have directly regulated that activity. 239
231. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,770-71 (1993).
232. 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1509-10 (1996).
233. Compare Posadas De Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico 478 U.S. 328,
341 (1986), with Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767.
234. See supra notes 80,82,92, 156.
235. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1593 (1995).
236. Id. See also Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2381 (1995)(Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)(advocating the Supreme Court require the government to show actual surveys,
sample size or selection procedures, explanations of methodology, and discussion of excluded
results).
237. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,770-71 (1993).
238. Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1592.
239. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1589 n.2. Accord Ralph D. Davis, Advertising Bans Vulnerable
to Constitutional and Statutory Challenges, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, June 9, 1995 at 1. But see
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While the FDA has proffered evidence that its advertising
regulations would reduce smoking by children,m the tobacco lobby
has produced counter-statistics of comparable weight. 241 This battle
illustrates the unworkable nature of Central Hudson because any
judicial determination of prong three is necessarily subjective and
practically arbitrary depending on the relative credibility recognized
by any particular court. Furthermore, because both sides can point to
studies regarding the effects of tobacco advertising on children
smoking and the burden is clearly on the government 42 to
"convinc[e]" the court that its regulation will advance its purported
interest in a direct and material way, 3 the Court should strike the ban
on prong-three grounds. 2
Conflicting regulatory policy regarding disclosure of tobacco
information poses a problem for the government, as well. Coors
summarily rejected the government's claim that a labeling ban would
directly and materially advance its interests in curbing strength wars,
primarily because the government's general regulatory scheme
regarding alcohol favored information dissemination.4 5 Chilling
tobacco advertising would sanction the very same inconsistency Coors
rejects, because the general thrust of tobacco policy has mandated
disclosure closely akin to alcohol.?
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305, 1315 (4th Cir. 1995)(Anheuser-Busch I)(holding
"restricting the outdoor advertising of alcoholic beverages directly and materially advances the
campaign against underage drinking.").
240. Noah & Noah, supra note 17, at 57.
241. See generally Maria Mallory, That's One Angry Camel, Bus. WK., Mar. 7, 1994, at 94.
242. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71.
243. Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1593.
244. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada recently overturned a law banning all tobacco
advertising in the country because it found a lack of direct scientific evidence showing a causal
link between advertising bans and decrease in tobacco use. RJR-MacDonald, Inc. v. Attorney
General of Canada, No. 23460-23490 (Can. 1995).
245. See supra text accompanying note 107.
246. For example, the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 requires that all
cigarette labels and advertising include rotational warnings:
"SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease,
Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious
Risk to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in
Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight.
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44 Liquormart and Coors also reflect the Court's revived
emphasis on Central Huson's fourth prong. While the Court has
applied varying levels of scrutiny under prong four,247 these recent
decisions mark (at a minimum) a revival of Central Hudson's mandate
for intermediate scrutiny. A unanimous Court in 44 Liquormart found
that Rhode Island's regulation violated the First Amendment because
the State had less restrictive means of achieving its purported purpose
of temperance.' The State could have levied taxes, initiated
educational campaigns, limited per capita purchases, or even directly
regulated the product. These alternatives are readily available in the
war against tobacco and render the FDA's regulations
unconstitutional at least at this early stage of aggressive regulation.
In combatting tobacco, the most obvious and effective alternative
to chilling speech is counter-speech. 4 9 Counter-speech directly
furthers the First Amendment's purpose of encouraging pervasive and
open dialogue. Such dialogue has proven not only viable, but
extremely effective, in furthering recent social concerns. For example,
Nancy Reagan's campaign against drugs via massive advertising and
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contatins Carbon Monoxide."
Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4(a), 98 Stat. 2201, 2201-02 (1984)(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1333(a) (Supp. IV 1986)). See Polin, supra note 14, at 101. See also Cipollone v. Ligett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 511 n.5 (1992)(explaining Congress' intent in drafting the Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act was to further policy of adequately informing public).
247. Under Central Hudson, a regulation of commercial speech violates the First
Amendment if it is more extensive than necessary. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). In subsequent cases the Court reduced the
fourth prong to a requirement of a reasonable "fit" between the governmental interest and the
regulation. Posadas De Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341
(1986); Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,4769 (1989). In Fox, the
Court refused to apply a "least restrictive means" approach, and ruled that the regulation should
not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further" its interests. 492 U.S. at 478
(citation omitted). Posadas and Fox misapply the Central Hudson test. Coors implicitly corrects
this misapplication and reverts to a quasi-"least restrictive means approach." Coors, 115 S. Ct. at
1594 (labeling ban fails prong four because it is "more extensive than necessary.").
248. 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1510,1515, 1519, 1521-22 (1996).
249. Viewpoints: Kids Mustn't Smoke; Clinton's Right to Regulate Nicotine As a Drug,
Although His Limits on Ads Go Too Far, NEWSDAY, Aug. 14, 1995, at A18; Howard Wolinsky,
Proposals Made to Limit Kids' Access to Tobacco, CI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at 71; David A.
Locke, Counterspeech As An Althernative to Prohibition: Proposed Federal Regulation of
Tobacco Promotion In American Motorsport, 70 IND. L.J. 217 (1994); Ahron Leichtman, Top Ten
Ways to Attack the Tobacco Industry And Win The War Against Smoking, 13 ST. Louis U. PuB. L.
REV. 729 (1994); Weber & Marks, supra note 14, at 57; Comment, Up In Smoke, supra note 14, at
724.
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public forums directly effectuated a decrease in drug use.5 Safe sex
campaigns prompted by the AIDS epidemic have achieved similar
success. 251 In fact, it was precisely what the Clinton ban seeks-less
information-which sustained the pervasiveness of both drug use and
the AIDS virus.
Other viable alternatives include imposing excise taxes on
tobacco products,252 creating statutory tort claims against tobacco
companies,5 banning smoking in public, imposing heavy fines and
revoking licenses from stores which sell cigarettes to minors, or even
banning outright the production, sale, and use of tobacco.' From a
purely politcal standpoint, perhaps the FDA is shunning its
repsonsibility by not declaring illegal the production and sale of
cigarettes, a product known to be a leading cause of death in the
United States. That decision is within its discretion. The decision to
regulate speech, however, is not within the FDA's discretion. The
existence of any one of these alternatives alone precludes, under
Central Hudson, a Clinton-type tobacco advertising ban. Accordingly,
the ban fails the Central Hudson test under prong four as well.
2. Assessing Recent Fourth Circuit Opinions
While some legal scholars and opponents to the FDA proposal
have declared 44 Liquormart a "very powerful victory for the entire
250. Benjamin A. Gilman, Missing the Target in the War on Drugs, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 6,
1996, at B4 (noting Nancy Reagan's "Just say no" campaign significantly reduced drug use).
251. David Tuller, Peer Pressure for Safer Sex Outreach Pays Off for Young Gay Men,
Research Shows, S.F. CHRON, Aug. 14, 1996 at A16 (citing study showing 26% reduction in
unsafe sex as a result of AIDS-consciousness programs).
252. See also Leslie Savan, Cigarettes, Death, And Taxes: Nicoteen Meets the Memoboro Man
at the Tombstone Ad, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 14, 1995, at 27; Wolinsky, supra note 249, at 71;
Leichtman, supra note 249.
253. See Cipolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)(holding Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act did not preempt tort claims against tobacco company based on
express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy); Leichtman, supra note
249, at 729; Karen E. Meade, Breaking Through the Tobacco Industry's Smoke Screen: State
Lawsuits for Reimbursement of Medical Expenses, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 113, 127 (1996) (discussing
recent state-enacted enabling statutes authorizing state agencies to file suit against tobacco
companies to recover health subsidies paid by states).
254. Anastasia Hendrix, Teen Smoking Strikes Out Under New Law, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 28,
1997, at Al (discussing new FDA regulation effective March 1, 1997, requiring merchants request
identification from all tobacco purchasers who appear younger than 27 years old).
255. A direct outright ban on a product is less-restrictive, for First Amendment purposes,
than maintaining the legality of a product but restricting communications relating to that
product. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1593 (1995); 44 Liquormart Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1512 (1996)(plurality opinion).
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advertising community,' proponents-including President
Clinton,' as well as the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,'
have narrowly construed 44 Liquormart's impact on tobacco
advertising regulations aimed at protecting minors. 59 In Penn
Advertising of Baltimore v. Baltimore, plaintiff challenged a city
ordinance which prohibited all cigarette advertisements "in a publicly
visible location"-including "outdoor billboards, sides of building[s]
and freestanding signboards."' Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke involved
a similar Baltimore ordinance aimed at liquor advertisements. 61 In
their respective first appeals, the Fourth Circuit held that both
ordinances were constitutionally sound under Central Hudson."' On
appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded both cases for
consideration in light of 44 Liquormart.2  In affirming judgment in
both cases, the Fourth Circuit erroneously applied 44 Liquormart
because it did not compel the government to satisfy its strict burden of
proving a correlation between the regulations and their effects on the
city's proffered goals and because it read 44 Liquormart too
narrowly.6
The Fourth Circuit reconciled Penn I and Anheuser-Busch I with
44 Liquormart on the following grounds:' (1) because 44 Liquormart
256. Joan Biskupic, Justices Strike Down State Ban on Advertising of Liquor Prices, WASH.
POST, May 14, 1996, at A4.
257. Id.
258. Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Baltimore, 101 F.3d 332, 333 (4th Cir.
1996)[hereinafter Penn I]; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir.
1996) [hereinafter Anheuser-Busch I14.
259. See supra text accompanying note 251, infra text accompanying note 265.
260. Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318, 1321 (4th Cir.
1995)[hereinafter Penn 1].
261. Anheuser-Busch II, 101 F.3d at 327.
262. Penn 1, 63 F.3d at 1326; Anheuser-Busch 1, 63 F.3d at 327.
263. Penn Adver., Inc. v. Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996); Anheuser-Busch v. Baltimore, 116
S. Ct. 1821 (1996).
264. While this section provides a'critique of the Fourth Circuit's interpretation and
application of Central Hudson in light of 44 Liquormart, it does not criticize directly the Fourth
Circuit's pre-44 Liquormart decisions in Penn I and Anheuser-Busch . The Fourth Circuit's
holdings and rationales in those cases, however, are indirectly addressed throughout this Note.
For a detailed review of the Fourth Circuit's pre-44 Liquormart decisions, see Johnson, supra
note 62; Thomas D. Blue, Jr., Note, Over the Edge: The Fourth Circuit's Commercial Speech
Analysis in Penn Advertising and Anheuser-Busch, 74 N.C.L. REv. 2086 (1996).
265. In Penn II, the Fourth Circuit issued a one paragraph opinion essentially bootstrapping
its reconciliation of 44 Liquormart in Anheuser-Busch II, stating, "we affirm [Penn] for the
reasons previously given and readopt our previous decision as modified by Anheuser-Busch II,"
101 F.3d at 333. Accordingly, this Part will address Penn II and Anheuser-Busch II collectively,
referring to the Fourth Circuit's approach in general.
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was merely a plurality opinion, its holding must be viewed "as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on
the narrowest grounds;"' (2) in 44 Liquormart, the state issued a
blanket ban "in any manner whatsoever" on price advertising, while
the Baltimore ordinances only prohibited advertisements in particular
areas where children are likely to walk or play; (3) Baltimore's
ordinances target only those persons who cannot be legal users of
alcoholic beverages and tobacco, not legal users as in 44 Liquormart;
and (4) while the Supreme Court in 44 Liquormart feared that Rhode
Island was circumventing public scrutiny by substituting a direct ban
on advertising for a ban on the product, no such attempt to undermine
democratic processes is evident with regard to the Baltimore
ordinances.
The Fourth Circuit read 44 Liquormart narrowly, finding that the
only rationale agreed upon by a majority was that Rhode Island's ban
failed Central Hudson's fourth prong because there were other, less
restrictive methods of reducing alcohol consumption available.'
Despite the obvious parallel between Rhode Island's and Baltimore's
ordinance, the Fourth Circuit failed to even mention, let alone justify,
how Baltimore satisfied prong four without a showing that the lesser
alternatives specifically cited in 44 Liquormart-taxes, educational
programs, direct regulation, the establishment of minimum prices-
could not advance the city's interests in protecting children. The
Fourth Circuit's failure to address this issue proves the point Justice
Thomas articulated in his concurrence in 44 Liquormart: an
advertising regulation could rarely, if ever, satisfy Central Hudson's
fourth prong as literally read and currently applied.' This is because
even direct regulation of the product is less restrictive for First
Amendment purposes. 269
Nor was the fact that Rhode Island issued a "blanket" ban a
determinative factor in 44 Liquormart. While the Fourth Circuit
sanctioned Baltimore's regulations because the city left undisturbed
advertising channels to adults, 44 Liquormart is devoid of any mention
266. Anheuser-Busch 11, 101 F.3d at 328 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977)).
267. Anheuser-Busch 11, 101 F.3d at 328 (noting eight justices, in three separate opinions,
found alternative forms of regulation which could promote temperance without impinging upon
speech).
268. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1519-1520 n.7 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
269. See id.
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of the relative quantity of advertising prohibited and retained as a
variable justifying advertising regulation. The Fourth Circuit
committed clear legal error in relying on this factor. A partial ban
which leaves open other channels of advertising communication is no
less subject to intermediate scrutiny than a blanket ban.27° Moreover,
Baltimore presented no evidence corroborating the correlative effect
of the regulation on children, and the ordinance did not clearly mark
the boundaries of the advertising limitations. Thus, the Court took the
city at its word-without requiring Baltimore to satisfy its evidentiary
burden7-and sanctioned a ban which, while purportedly aimed at
children, certainly had the effect of limiting the amount of information
disseminated to adult consumers. This is undoubtedly inapposite to 44
Liquormart and Coors, both of which reiterated the strong burden on
the state to prove that the regulation would directly and materially
advance its interests.'
The Fourth Circuit's emphasis on the fact that the Baltimore
ordinances were aimed at protecting children utterly lacks support in
commercial speech jurisprudence. While it is clear that the standards
by which First Amendment speech may be assessed in other contexts
sometimes include variable levels of scrutiny when aimed at protecting
children,' the Court has sanctioned this "children exception" only in
limited areas such as child pornography and indecency. 4 In fact, the
270. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 427 (1993); Blount v. Rizzi,
400 U.S. 410,416 (1971) (quotation omitted).
271. See also Blue, Jr. supra note 264.
272. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1509; Anheuser-Busch 11, 101 F.3d at 331 (Butzner,
J., dissenting).
273. Compare Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-68 (1969)(establishing right to private
possession of adult pornography in home), with Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990)
(upholding legislation prohibiting use of children in pornography). See also FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726,750 (1978)(distinguishing indecent speech during hours when children have
radio access, as compared to late evening hours, when children are asleep). These cases-all cited
by the Fourth Circuit in support of its children exception-are not persuasive authority in the
context of commercial speech regulation. There is a stark difference between protecting a child
from behavior--e.g., posing for pornography-and from being exposed to speech. Moreover,
there is no indecent speech implicated in most commercial speech contexts, most importantly, the
speech at issue in Penn and Anheuser-Busch. Thus, while the Court has distinguished children in
the contexts of pornography and indecent speech cases, it has clearly precluded advertising
regulations aimed at protecting children. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14
(1975)("Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate
proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a
legislative body thinks unsuitable for them. In most circumstances, the values protected by the
First Amendment are no less applicable when government seeks to control the flow of
information to minors."). See generally Bolger v. Yangs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
274. Id. at 73.
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Court has specifically rejected such an exception in the context of
commercial speech. 5 Despite this clear precedent, the Fourt Circuit
found support in the dicta of a 1944 case wherein the Supreme Court
declared: "A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as
citizens. '' 6 For some perspective in considering the persuasiveness of
this authority, consider this: at the time of this quote, only two years
had passed since the Supreme Court first identified the concept
commercial speech, and defined its parameters in a much more
permissive manner than the Court currently employs.
The Fourth Circuit's final factor-that the Baltimore ordinances
did not reflect a legislative intent to circumvent political
accountability-can be dismissed briefly. First, if a legislature were
hiding behind political subterfuge, how can its true motive be
discovered? Because such a motive can rarely be discerned, there is no
practical way to apply this factor on a case-by-case basis. Second, the
discussions regarding political accountability in 44 Liquormart were
far broader than the case before the Court. Using very general terms,
Justice Stevens stated:
It is the State's interest in protecting consumers from 'commercial
harms' that provides 'the typical reason why commercial speech can
be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial
speech.' Yet bans that target truthful, nonmisleading commercial
messages rarely protect consumers from such harms. Instead, such
bans often serve only to obscure an 'underlying governmental policy'
that could be implemented without regulating speech.27
Justice Thomas was similarly broad in his language, discussing
how, "in case after case following Virginia Pharmacy Board," the
Court recognized, "the dangers of permitting the government to do
covertly what it might not have been able to muster the political
support to do openly."' Accordingly, the political subterfuge
rationale in 44 Liquormart should be read as a general concern in
commercial speech regulation, and not as a factor to be applied in fact-
specific cases.
275. Id.
276. Anheuser-Busch II, 101 F.3d at 330 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168
(1944)).
277. 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1508 (1996)(emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
278. Id. at 1517 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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IV
Conclusion
The commercial/noncommercial speech dichotomy is based on an
illusory definition and faulty premises, and should be eradicated in
favor of heightening the protection of commercial speech to the level
at which political speech is protected. The Court's definition of
commercial speech-"speech which proposes a commercial
transaction"-is too basic for broad application because most speech
historically categorized as commercial speech is multi-faceted,
containing both commercial and political components. Furthermore,
the Court's proffered distinguishing characteristics of commercial
speech are illusory because the distinctions are illogically applied
outside the context of the simplest commercial transaction.
Moreover, while the public has a strong interest in accessing
commercial information to make informed decisions, the government
has no legitimate interest in curtailing commercial speech. In fact, as
Justices Blackmun and Thomas have criticized, the government's only
possible interest in curtailing commercial speech is its interest in
procuring a political compromise and circumventing tougher political
considerations, such as direct regulation. As discussed throughout this
Note, President Clinton's recent effort to regulate tobacco advertising
illustrates these realities and their paternalistic effect on both
commercial and public interests in the free flow of commercial
information. Accordingly, the Court should elevate commercial
speech protection to that which political speech enjoys.
Alternatively, Clinton's proposed ban on tobacco advertising
should be held unconstitutional under Central Hudson's intermediate
scrutiny standard for protecting commercial speech. The government
could fail its prong-two burden of showing a substantial interest in
protecting children because the Court has been reluctant to chill
speech for the sole purpose of protecting children. Moreover, because
federal regulations regarding tobacco have, in the past, encouraged
the flow of information, the Court should not be receptive 'to the
government's claim of a substantial interest in chilling speech. The ban
would also fail prong three because there is conflicting evidentiary
data-at best-and the government cannot meet its burden of
convincing the Court that its regulation will, in a direct and material
way, achieve the government's contemplated goals. The ban also
violates prong four because there are several viable alternatives to
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banning tobacco advertising, including counter-advertising, excise
taxes, and direct regulation.
